P-38 Crash auf Flugshow

[Toryu]

Ein schon etwas älteres Video, aber trotzdem sehr schockierend:

https://www.micom.net/oops/P38%20crash.wmv

[JaBoG32_Ghost]

Sch****, das ist echt übel.

[JaBoG32_Prinzartus]

Der Pilot wird das wohl kaum überlebt haben, oder doch? Weiß jemand was darüber?

[Hawk]

OMG! Der arme Pilot! Und das Flugzeug!

Vor kurzem ist bei uns in der Schweiz auch eine nachgebaute Spifire runtergekommen...

In letzter Zeit passieren leider recht viele Unfälle oder Probleme in der Luft...

Kann das selbst bestätigen, die Klappen von meinem Schulungsflugzeug bleiben machmal auch draussen hängen und lassen sich net mehr bewegen. Sind beim letzten Flug noch so knapp über die Hochspannungsleitung gekommen...

Gruss Hawk

[Toryu]

Das war eine P-38J mit dem Namen "California Cutie" in Duxford (1996).

Der Pilot hat leider nicht überlebt.

Hier der Bericht der FAA :



Lockheed P-38J Lightning, N3145X
AAIB Bulletin No: 5/97 Ref: EW/C96/7/4Category: 1.1
Aircraft Type and Registration: Lockheed P-38J Lightning, N3145X
No & Type of Engines: 2 Allison V-1710 (1,425 hp) piston engines
Year of Manufacture: 1943 (Rebuilt 1992)

Date & Time (UTC): 14 July 1996 at 1451 hrs

Location: Duxford Airfield, Cambridgeshire

Type of Flight: Aerial Work (Flying Display)

Persons on Board: Crew - 1 - Passengers - None

Injuries: Crew - Fatal - Passengers - N/A

Nature of Damage: Aircraft destroyed

Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot's Licence

Commander's Age: 54 years

Commander's Flying Experience: 14,500 hours (of which 60 were on type)

Last 90 days - 11 hours on type

Last 28 days - 5 hours on type

Information Source: AAIB Field Investigation
The aircraft was performing at the 'Flying Legends' Air Displayat Duxford, which was being staged
over the two days of the weekendof 13/14 July 1996. The display on 13 July was completed
withoutincident. On 14 July, the aircraft had taken off at 1435 hrsas the lead aircraft in a formation
comprising one Curtiss P-40BTomahawk and one Bell P-63 King Cobra fighter aircraft. The
display'slot' commenced at 1439 hrs and after several formation passesin front of the assembly of
spectators, the trio split up in orderto enable each aircraft to carry out a solo display. The P-38was
the final aircraft to perform its solo routine and was dueto clear the display area by 1455 hrs. The
aircraft commencedits run in from the east of the airfield, in a shallow dive togain speed, then
carried out a loop. This manoeuvre was followedby a 'Cuban Eight' manoeuvre, which involved
two short periodsof flight under negative 'g'. As the aircraft returned to normalpositive 'g' flight
after each of these periods, a slight trailof light coloured vapour was noted coming from under the
mainbody of the aircraft (post-accident consideration of the aircraftsystems concluded that this was
most likely to have been vapourescaping from the fuel tank vent lines).
At the end of the 'Cuban Eight', the aircraft was passing fromeast to west (crowd left to right). It
pulled up and to the leftinitially, levelled the wings, then performed a 270° rollto the left. The
aircraft then came back to pass acrossthe front of the crowd from west to east.
With the aircraft appearing to be at a normal entry height andspeed, an aileron roll to the left was
commenced as the aircraftcrossed the western threshold of the hard surfaced Runway 06. The first
360° roll was completed apparently normally butthe aircraft continued, without pause, into a
second full roll. While the aircraft was inverted in this second roll, the nosepitched towards the
ground and the aircraft began to lose heightwhile the roll continued. By the time the aircraft
became uprightagain, it had descended to a very low height above the runway. The aircraft
continued to roll left and struck the runway withits left wing, with some 30° of left bank applied,
abouttwo thirds of the way along Runway 06.
The left outer wing ruptured and collapsed, followed by an impactof the left engine. At this time, a
large fireball erupted asthe aircraft began to cartwheel across the airfield, breakingup into multiple
fragments as its trajectory took it diagonallyaway from the main spectator area towards a row of
parked lightaircraft on the south side of the airfield. Several of theseaircraft were destroyed or
severely damaged in the wreckage'spath. One of the engines bounced further than the rest of
thewreckage, crossing the airfield boundary and then the M11 Motorwaywhich runs almost
perpendicular to the end of the runway. A passingfreight truck sustained some minor damage from
pieces of wreckagebut was able to continue travelling northwards along the motorway. The engine
came to rest in a field just to the east side of themotorway, close to where several members of the
public had beenstanding in order to watch the flying activities from outsidethe airfield boundary.
The airfield Fire and Rescue services were quickly at the sceneand brought the numerous areas of
fire under control in a shorttime. The pilot was found in the seat, with his four point harnessstill
fastened, amongst the wreckage of the main fuselage pod. A post-mortem examination found that
the pilot had been killedby a severe head injury. No physical condition was found whichcould have
caused any incapacitation of the pilot and no tracesof drugs nor alcohol were found to be present. It
was assessedthat the destruction of the cockpit was such that survival wasimpossible.
The pilots and passengers of the visiting light aircraft had beenrequired, by the airport operator, to
move to the spectator sideof the runway in order to watch the air display. Fortunately,there were no
injuries to any spectators.
The display routine followed by the P-38 formation was identicalto that flown at the display on the
day prior to the accident. The significant difference was that during the Saturday display,only a
single 360° aileron roll had been carried out, butat the time of the accident two consecutive 360°
rolls hadoccurred, with a continuation past the wings level at the endof the second roll.
Soon after the accident, the air display organisers made an announcementover the public address
system for any spectators who had photographed,or taken video footage of, the final manoeuvre to
hand in theirfilms/tapes on loan for the purposes of this investigation. Anexcellent response was
forthcoming, which resulted in AAIB havingaccess to some 60 video tapes and 40 sets of
photographs of theevent.
The weather at the time was a surface wind from 270° at 6kt, variable in direction between 240°
and 300°, visibilityin excess of 10 km, scattered cloud base 3,000 feet, QNH 1026mb.
Video Analysis (Figure 1)
Photographs and video coverage of the aircraft's manoeuvres wereanalysed with a view to assessing
not only the pre-impact flightpath characteristics but also the pre-impact aircraft integrityand the
operation of aircraft systems. A full flight path analysiswas carried out using several video
sequences which had been filmedfrom a variety of viewpoints.
A recording was available of the Saturday display, where one aileronroll to the left was performed.
The time taken to complete theroll on this occasion was 3.4 seconds and it was noted that
theaircraft had an upward trajectory throughout this manoeuvre.
The analysis of the accident coverage showed that the aircrafthad performed two continuous aileron
rolls, taking 4.4 secondsand 3.6 seconds respectively to complete. This had been startedat a height
of about 250 feet above the runway, at a speed ofabout 250 knots and with an initial nose-up pitch
attitude. The roll, to the left, was initiated by a rapid roll controlinput to produce a considerable
aileron deflection. This ailerondeflection remained more or less constant until the aircraft
hadcompleted about 675° of roll. At that point, the aileronswere returned to the neutral position
where they remained untilthe aircraft struck the ground.
During the first roll the aircraft climbed to an apogee of about360 feet when inverted, descending to
about 260 feet by the timeit was erect again. At this point the aircraft pitch attitudewas
approximately horizontal or very slightly nose-down. Therewas no pause before the second roll was
executed. During thisroll, the nose dropped progressively and an increasing rate ofdescent built up.
At the inverted position the aileron positionwas observed to be being maintained in the almost fully
(leftroll) deflected position and a considerable elevator displacementin the 'stick back' sense was
made. Considerable left ruddercontrol was also added at this time and the roll rate increased. About
45° of roll before the aircraft became erect, therudder and aileron inputs were moved to neutral, but
were notapplied in opposition to the roll. The rate of roll was seento increase slightly as the aircraft
rolled through wings level(from about 110°/sec to 125°/sec), with a rate of descentof about 7,200
feet per minute, to the point of impact. Groundspeed at impact was assessed as 230 kt. The final
angle of descentwas 14.5°, giving a speed along the flight path of 238 kt.
Impact was seen to occur on the left wing tip at an attitude ofabout 30° left roll with the fuselage
level in pitch. Theaileron and rudder positions were approximately neutral and theelevator was
deflected up.
An analysis of the propeller speeds from video showed that theyremained constant throughout the
rolling manoeuvre. Both propellerswere turning at about 1,300 RPM, the right slightly faster
thanthe left. With the engine propeller reduction gearing ratio of2:1, this accorded with the aircraft
operating limitations whichquoted the engine limits for use in aerobatic manoeuvres as
2,600RPM/40 inches manifold pressure.
It was also noted on the video coverage that the coolant radiatorexit flaps were not symmetric for
each engine. Those for theleft engine were noted to be fully open, while those for the rightengine
were in trail, for a large part of the final display sequence. Correct engine operation during the
manoeuvres was assessed byother means and any possible effect of the asymmetry on the
handlingof the aircraft was not considered to be significant.
Engineering Investigation
The aircraft had struck Runway 06, straddling the centreline andabout 450 metres short of the
eastern end. The initial impacthad been of the left wingtip on the runway and the sequence ofmarks
of the immediately subsequent impacts was consistent withthe aircraft being on a heading of about
079°M (the runwayheading is 062°M), in a substantially level pitch attitudeand significantly
banked to the left. Examination of the cutsmade by both propellers in the runway surface indicated
that bothengines were developing considerable power and that the aircrafthad a high rate of
descent. Initial assessment of the propellermarks, without making allowances for rate of descent,
indicatedthat the aircraft had struck the ground with engine speeds ofthe order of 2500 RPM
associated with a ground speed of about200 kt.
After the initial impact, the left outer wing, empennage and bothtailbooms separated from the
remainder of the airframe which yawedsharply to the left before crossing the southern edge of the
runwayand cartwheeling across the grass. The main wreckage came torest, inverted, in a wheat
field, about 420 metres from the pointof initial impact, just outside the southern boundary of the
airfield. Both engines became detached from their mountings after impact;the right had been
thrown 60 metres beyond where the main wreckagecame to rest and the left 180 metres beyond,
crossing the M11Motorway. Although the aircraft had burst into flames very shortlyafter the initial
impact, there was little evidence of substantialfuel spillage between the point of initial impact and
where themain wreckage came to rest, there being only isolated areas ofblackened grass. There
was, however, evidence of a moderatelysevere ground fire around the main wreckage and a
considerablearea of the wheat field, generally to the south (right) of anextension of the line between
the initial impact and the mainwreckage, had been burnt.
The wreckage was removed to the AAIB facility at Farnborough formore detailed examination.
This revealed no evidence of any pre impact structural distressof the airframe nor loss of
attachment of control surfaces. Therewas no evidence of pre-impact loss of integrity of the
controlsystems, all damage being consistent with the nature and degreeof structural break-up after
impact. The extent of the disruptionto the control systems precluded eliminating the possibility
ofany transient obstruction of the systems. Assessment of the scrapemarks on the left outer wing
and aileron, made during the initialcontact on the runway, showed that the aileron had been at a
substantiallyneutral position at that moment. Damage on the left end rib ofthe elevator and on the
closing rib at the left end of the tailplanecut-out indicated that the elevator had been deflected up at
thetime the left fin base struck the runway. The impact positionsof both ailerons and elevator
surfaces were confirmed by the videoanalysis.
The aileron boosters were examined. The position of the by-passcontrol piston of the left booster
showed that, when it becamedisrupted at the time of impact, hydraulic pressure had been available.
Damage to the input rod of its control valve indicated that therehad been no aileron movement
demand at that time and damage tothe output rod of the actuating cylinder was consistent with
itsbeing at a neutral position. All damage to the left and rightbooster assemblies was consistent with
the damage to the structureto which they were attached and there was no evidence of any preimpactfailures.
The blade pitch change mechanisms both propellers were examined;the initial dismantling being
performed with the assistance ofthe operator's maintenance organisation. This revealed no
evidenceof malfunction nor damage inconsistent with that sustained asa result of impact. It was not
possible, from examination ofthe pitch control gear quadrants from the blade roots, to
establishexact blade pitch settings at impact. However, impact damageto the teeth of the quadrant
gears indicated, on balance, thatboth propellers had been working within their governed pitch
rangeand consequently at selected speed. It was not possible to determinethe selected speed from
the engine mounted governors.
Pilot's Flying Experience and Documentation
The pilot held an Airline Transport Pilot's Licence and was typerated on Boeing 737 series, Boeing
757/767 and Piper PA-23/34/44series aircraft. He was a Captain with a UK charter airline
flyingBoeing 757 and 767 aircraft and was the Chief Pilot for the operatorof the P-38, responsible
for the crewing and operation of a variedfleet of some 15 vintage 'warbird' aircraft types.
The pilot was also the Air Show Display Co-ordinator for the 'FlyingLegends' display at Duxford,
being responsible for the planningof the display items and for the choreography of the show
finale,which also involved leading a mass flypast of some 40 historicaircraft. He gave the daily
display briefing to the participatingpilots and undertook some in-show replanning on the Sunday
afternoonwhen the planned show sequence was interrupted by the arrivalof a significant display
item almost an hour ahead of the plannedschedule. This undoubtedly added to the pilot's workload
forthe afternoon. Shortly after this, the pilot participated inthe show in the lead aircraft of a pair of
DH89A Dragon Rapides. After landing from this, there was then some 12 minutes beforehe then
taxied out in the P38 for the start of that displayitem.
The pilot was operating the P-38, an aircraft registered in theUSA, under the privileges of his FAA
Commercial Pilot's Licence. Under normal circumstances, as the aircraft maximum take-offweight
was in excess of 5,700 kg (12,500 lb), a specific aircrafttype rating would be required. In this case,
the pilot held aletter, issued by the FAA Flight Standards District Office inOakland, California
during 1988, which authorised him to operateas pilot-in-command in experimental category aircraft
- "Alltypes and makes of high performance piston-powered aircraft." The letter also noted that it
did not, in itself, authorise theperformance of aerobatics in airshows. A separate authorisationfor
this activity is required, but only in respect of participationat airshows within the USA.
The FAA indicated that the documentation held by the pilot didcomply with the appropriate
US Federal Aviation Regulationsand the special operating limitations for the aircraft duringthis
flight. However, the FAA did note that since the issue ofthe letter of authority, the procedures had
since been changedto reflect current requirements, but the letter remained valid.
A Biennial Flight Review certification (to validate the FAA licence)was entered in the pilot's flying
log book by an FAA CertificatedFlight Instructor on 16 July 1995.
The pilot held a CAA Display Authorisation (DA) covering manyaircraft types including the P-38.
He also held an appointmentas a Display Authorisation Evaluator on behalf of the CAA.
The pilot's DA had a current validation and permitted the performanceof flypasts down to 30 feet
agl and aerobatic manoeuvres (in certaintypes) down to 100 feet agl. For the P-38, the minimum
aerobaticheight was specified as 200 feet agl. Formation flyingwas also permitted.
From the video evidence available, it was apparent that the pilotcommenced the final rolling
manoeuvre at a height which was inaccordance with his DA.
On the Saturday, the day prior to the accident, the pilot flewa similar display profile but with only
one aileron roll at crowdcentre. Some minor transgressions of the pilot's DA limitationswere noted
by the attending CAA Air Display Inspector, notablyin terms of the minimum aerobatic height
during the aileron rolland for being marginally inside the minimum lateral separationdistance
appropriate for aerobatics. Both of these comments weremade by the Inspector to the pilot after the
event and the pilotgave assurance that the Sunday display would fully conform tothe DA
limitations.
The pilot had conducted a display practice in the P-38 on 11 Julyand had flown in the public
display on 13 July. In the 28 dayperiod prior to the accident, the pilot had also flown each ofthe
following types: Boeing 757, Spitfire V, Hellcat, Skyraider,Bearcat, Rapide, Aztec, Baron and Cub.
Aircraft History and Documentation
The aircraft was manufactured during 1943 at the Lockheed AircraftFactory in Burbank, California
and had the serial number 42-67543. It operated in service with the United States Army Air
Forceuntil being discharged in February 1945. It was found by itscurrent owner in a derelict state in
Texas in 1988. After purchase,it was taken to California and restored to flying condition.Test flying
was carried out early in 1992 and the aircraft wasimported into the UK during the summer of that
year. Since then,the aircraft has operated under a CAA Exemption to the Air NavigationOrder
which permitted the aircraft to fly without a valid Certificateof Airworthiness for the purposes of
Demonstration and Exhibitionflying only, provided that the FAA Special Airworthiness
Certificateand Operating Limitations dated 9 January 1992 were current.
The FAA Special Airworthiness Certificate was issued in January1992 in the Experimental
category, for the purposes of Exhibitionflying and was current at the time of the accident. The
aircraftwas being operated in accordance with the Operating Limitationsdocument. The aircraft's
maintenance documents showed that ithad been correctly maintained in accordance with the FAA
requirementsand had been properly certified by an FAA approved licensed engineer. The FAA
Certificate of Registration was issued on 21 February1992 to an owner with an address in Las
Vegas, Nevada.
The aircraft was also subject to an exemption issued by the CAAin order to allow it to operate at
speeds greater than 250 ktwhile below 10,000 feet. A current Aerial Work Operating Permitfor the
aircraft had also been issued by the Department of Transport.
The pilot had compiled a set of aircraft operating notes for theP-38, which indicated that, for
aerobatics, the engine limitswere 2,600 RPM and 40 inches manifold pressure (the maximum
continuouspower setting for the aircraft), the entry speed for rolling manoeuvreswas 200 kt and that
no negative 'g' manoeuvres were permittedbecause of possible hydraulic problems. It was
ascertained thata previous occurrence of negative 'g' had caused a hydraulic aerationproblem which
prevented the landing gear down function, whichrequired manual hand pump operation to recover.
It was also indicatedthat the preferred rolling direction was to the left in orderto prevent the
unlocking of the nose landing gear door mechanism,which was known to have occurred during
previous rolls to theright. These hydraulic problems were not known to have causedany adverse
effects in the aileron booster systems.
Information from the aircraft's Maintenance Instruction Manualstates that with aileron hydraulic
boosters operating, the pilot'scontrol input applies one sixth of the total aileron load.
Theimplication of this is that, in the event of a failure of thehydraulic booster system, the aileron
control forces felt by thepilot would be six times greater than normal for a given ailerondeflection
under the same flight conditions. From examinationof the aileron booster system, it is considered
that, in the eventof a hydraulic failure while the ailerons were deflected duringthe rolling
manoeuvre, the aileron deflection would have tendedto reduce as a result of the aerodynamic
forces.
Copies of the original 1944 Pilot's Flight Operating Instructionsfor this type of aircraft were also
available. These containedthe following relevant extracts:
"AILERON CONTROL HYDRAULIC BOOSTER - ...On these airplanesmost of the aileron control
force is provided by hydraulic boost; the remainder is applied by the pilot....Control cables
whichcontrol the boost mechanism are mechanically connected to thecontrol surfaces, allowing
manual flight control in an emergency. The aileron boost shut-off valve is located on the right
sideof the cockpit near the pilot's control column. In addition tothis valve an automatic by-pass
valve is incorporated in the mechanismto allow free movement of the ailerons in case the hydraulic
pressureshould fail."
In the "Flight Restrictions" section, it was noted that"Snap Rolls" and continuous inverted flight
were prohibited. The section also contained the cautionary note:
" Extreme care must be taken during acrobatic manoeuvreswhich require a downward vertical
recovery. Acrobatics shouldnot be attempted at altitudes below 10,000 feet."
Duxford Airfield Information
Duxford airfield has a main Runway 06/24 of asphalt/concrete construction,dimensions 1,503
metres long and 45 metres wide. Additionally,to the north of this, is a parallel grass runway, 890
metres longby 30 metres wide (Figure 1). For air display purposes, the displayaxes are defined by
reference to either the grass or hard runways,dependant upon the speed of the participating aircraft.
For this display, participants were briefed that the display axisfor aircraft performing at speeds up
to 200 kt was the northernedge of the grass runway. The P-38 display speed was in excessof 200 kt,
so it was using the northern edge of the hard surfacedrunway as its display axis, in order to comply
with the minimumdistance requirements laid down in CAP 403.
When detailed measurements were checked during this investigation,it was found that there were
some anomalies in the display axisdistances at the western end of the airfield which did not meetthe
specified minima. This situation was advised to the airfieldmanagement at Duxford by AAIB and
the necessary changes were implementedin time for the subsequent public air display in September
1996. These involved the relocation of the display line (for aircraftup to 200 kt) to the southern
edge of the grass runway, and themovement of the crowd line northwards by 23 metres at the
westernend of the airfield.
The airfield General Flying Orders contain Annex B, Rules forDisplay and Demonstration Flying.
The Orders contain the statementthat "Aerobatic manoeuvres should be flown such that theyare
capable of being completed by 500 feet AGL." Thisrequirement was also stated in the daily briefing
notes producedby the airfield management.
Consideration of the final rolling manoeuvre
Evidence was obtained which showed that the aircraft had successfullycompleted a double rolling
manoeuvre in the past, with a significantupward trajectory apparent throughout. However, the
majorityof other pilots, who also flew aircraft belonging to the sameoperator, indicated that a single
aileron roll manoeuvre was byfar the more common. This view was supported by Air Display
Inspectorsfrom the CAA.
The pilot used a metal knee-board which was usually strapped aroundhis right leg. This was found
with the strap fastener undonein the debris adjacent to the main wreckage. Checks carried outon a
similar aircraft in the USA found that a similar knee-boardcould, if dislodged, become jammed in
the flight controls in anyof several places. The pilot also habitually carried (in hisflying suit) a
'multi-tool' and a screwdriver set with detachablebits. These were also found adjacent to the main
wreckage. Therewere no significant witness marks, either on the knee-board oron the tools, to
suggest that they had become jammed in the flyingcontrol mechanisms. The pilot's torch and other
personal effectswere found in-situ in his flying suit.
Consideration of the flight profile (Figure 1) indicates thatthe start of the final manoeuvre occurred
over the western endof the hard surfaced runway. At the end of the first roll, theaircraft was still in
a location which was to the right (west)of the centre of the crowd. It is considered unlikely that
thepilot would have intended to stop manoeuvring at this positionas the display would then have
appeared 'asymmetric' from thecrowd's viewpoint.
It is known that the pilot was a very experienced display pilotand produced high quality,
aesthetically pleasing displays. Thereis no evidence to explain why the aircraft entered the
secondpart of the final manoeuvre in a less than optimum pitch attitudewhich developed into a
significant downward trajectory. The possibilityof a temporary restriction to the flying controls
(especiallythe roll control), or some other form of distraction of the pilot,could not be dismissed.
Air Display Safety Review
In response to this and several other UK air display accidentswhich occurred during the 1996
display season, the CAA set upa Civil Air Display Review Group. The group identified some
18areas for detailed investigation and comment, covering many aspectsof display organisation and
participation. The work of the groupis currently ongoing but relevant recommendations should be
implemented,either by means of amendments to CAP 403 or by other means, intime for the start of
the 1997 display season. There is alsoan intention for the CAA to develop additional guidance
materialfor display pilots in a similar fashion to the RAF Flying DisplayNotes.
In view of the Review Group activity already being undertaken,AAIB considered that no further
Safety Recommendations were necessaryin this case.